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The Real Estate Recovery Fund: 
Stewart Title Guar. Co. v Park, 2001 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Stewart Title Guar. Co. v Park (9th Cir 2001) 250 F3d 1249 
Stewart Title Guaranty (Stewart) insured several lenders who lent money to property owners 
seeking to refinance existing loans through a mortgage broker (broker). The broker acted as 
escrow holder for the refinancings. As escrow agent, the broker was required to pay off the 
existing loans so that the new loans would be secured by first deeds of trust. On receiving the 
refinance funds for the escrow account, the broker embezzled the loan proceeds instead of 
paying off the existing liens. The title policy obligated Stewart to protect its insureds (the new 
lenders) against loss of priority. When the new lenders filed claims under the policies, Stewart 
paid off the senior liens, thus becoming subrogated to the rights of the new lenders.  
As subrogee, Stewart sued the broker and obtained a d fault judgment exceeding $1.2 million. 
When the broker failed to pay the judgment, Stewart applied to the state Department of Real 
Estate (DRE) for payment from the California Real Estate Recovery Fund (Fund) (Bus & P C 
§§10470–10481). When the DRE denied Stewart’s application, Stewart sought a court order 
directing payment out of the Fund. The district court denied Stewart’s claim. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Fund exists to “protect the public against loss resulting from 
misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty by real estate brokers who are unable to respond 
to damage awards.” 250 F3d at 1252. To recover from the Fund, the applicant must be an 
“aggrieved person” within the meaning of Bus & P C §10471(a) and must have diligently tried to 
collect from all liable persons in the transaction. A California court has defined “aggrieved 
person” as a client of the defrauding broker or a member of the general public. Because Stewart 
Title was neither the broker’s client nor a member of the public, it had no direct right of recovery 
from the Fund. The court held (250 F3d at 1255): 
The [Fund] is a limited fund of last resort created by the California legislature to protect 
members of the public who would otherwise have no recourse against unscrupulous real estate 
professionals. Title insurance companies were not itended by the California legislature to be 
“aggrieved parties” as that term is used in [Bus & P C §10471(a)]. 
Alternatively, Stewart argued that it was entitled to payment from the Fund as a subrogee of 
the aggrieved persons here (namely, the borrowers and new lenders). The court held that Stewart 
had no subrogation right because it was obligated under its policy to compensate the new lenders 
for their loss and, in turn, the new lenders were pr cluded from recovery from the Fund until 
they had pursued collection from all other liable persons. Once Stewart made the new lenders 
whole, there was no right of recovery to which Stewart could be subrogated. Thus, the DRE and 
the trial court properly denied Stewart’s claim forpayment from the Fund. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: Had a private insurance carrier refused to pay on the grounds 
successfully asserted here by the State Recovery Fund, my guess is that it might have been held 
liable for bad faith denial of coverage. The Fund has put itself in the enviable position of refusing 
to pay the primary party because it has not yet gone after some secondary party, while also 
refusing to pay the secondary party who compensated the primary party because it was not itself 
the primary party. Those are pretty formidable barriers to recovery from the Fund. 
The first horn of the defense is pretty secure because statute clearly requires the primary 
victim to first seek recovery from “all other person  liable to the claimant in the transaction.” 
Bus & P C §10471(c)(7)(E). It is the second horn—that even a subrogee (who was not itself a 
wrongdoer) cannot qualify as an “aggrieved person”—that I regard as based more on policy than 
on a technical reading of the Real Estate Recovery Act. 
Nonetheless, it is hard to understand how this could have happened without some negligence 
on Stewart Title’s part. It certainly should not have insured a lender’s lien priority unless it had 
sufficient control over the loan escrow as to make sure that the transaction was done correctly, 
i.e., that the senior lien was satisfied, that there were no intervening liens, and that the new lien 
was properly recorded, as well as making sure that t e loan funds were transmitted to the 
borrower. From the meager statement of facts in the opinion, it appears that none of these steps 
occurred.  
Generally, title insurers don’t indemnify mortgage lenders until they are certain that an actual 
loss has really occurred. If the insured’s mortgage lien turns out to be in second position rather 
than first, you can bet that the title company won’t offer money until it has been established that 
this lower priority results in a cash loss to the lender. After all, even second mortgages 
sometimes get paid.  
In this case, the loss was pretty obvious: It appears that the lenders got no lien at all on the 
properties (no mortgages seem to have been recorded, and even if they had, they were not 
supported by enforceable loans because the borrowers never received the funds). Nor, for the 
same reasons, could the lenders recover anything from the intended borrowers (except in the 
unlikely case that the loan broker was the borrowers’ agent, making them responsible for his 
conduct).  
But what about all that fine print in the policy? Isn’t there a clause somewhere that requires 
the insured to seek recovery from the loan broker (or the Fund, as the broker’s insurer)? More 
interestingly, if no such clause is there now, will there be one as a result of this decision? Will 
title insurers require their insureds to exhaust their remedies against their brokers first (possibly 
paying the litigation expenses for such actions) before they themselves have to pay? And, if so, 
could that include proceeding against the Fund? After all, the collateral-source rule says that 
insurance coverage generally does not bar recovery from a tortfeasor or his insurer, unless the 
Fund Act language is treated as repealing that rule in this context. Because the title company 
cannot recover from the Fund as a subrogee, it makes sense for it to demand that its insured do 
for it what it cannot do for itself. 
If title policies start to say such things, insureds may find themselves truly in a hard place: The 
Fund may say it won’t pay until after they have recovered from their title insurer, while their 
insurer may say that it won’t pay until after they have recovered from the Fund. Oh, the trouble 
crooked brokers make for us all! —Roger Bernhardt 
 
